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3Indonesian Secularities
On the Influence of the State-Islam Relationship on Legal 
and Political Developments
Abstract: This article aims to analyse the relationship between state and 
religion (in this case, Islam) in political and legal developments in Indo-
nesia from colonial times to the present, and to determine the model of 
Indonesian secularity within the multiple secularities approach. The legal 
and political developments relating to the relationship between the state 
and Islam in Indonesia are understood to be the products of societal debate 
as well as instruments for solving particular societal problems, guided by 
certain guiding ideas1 that shape Indonesian secularity.
The paper first describes Indonesia’s evolving socio-political condi-
tions, noting in particular the emergence of two distinct groups: Islamic 
groups calling for Islam to be made the foundation of the Indonesian state 
and for Islamic law to be enforced for Muslims in Indonesia, and natio- 
nalist groups that support the idea of a secular nation-state based on Pan-
casila, a set of five founding principles. In the second part, the paper out-
lines the development of Pancasila as a national agreement and state ideo- 
logy. The third part analyses the state’s legal policy on Islamic law. The 
fourth part analyses the relationship between the character of the contem-
poraneous regime and its attitude towards the aspirations of Islamic law. 
The fifth part analyses some state laws in Indonesia that relate to Islamic 
law in order to establish whether they constitute a legalisation of Islamic 
law and to what end the laws were created.
The sixth part determines the model of Indonesian secularity based on 
the societal problems to be solved by the legal and political developments 
and the guiding ideas referred to. The final part defines the general bounda- 
ries between the state and Islam.
1 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural 
Sociology of Secular Modernities,” Comparative Sociology 11, 6 (2012): 887.
4Introduction
In all countries, historical and socio-cultural factors influence the patterns 
of state-religion relationships. Even when they have been constitutional-
ly institutionalised, relationships are dynamic and fluid.2 There are three 
paradigms of state-religion relationships: integralistic, symbiotic, and secu- 
larist.3 These paradigms are the bases for different state models, namely the 
secular state, religious state, and a state that is not a religious state but does 
not strictly separate between state and religious affairs.
The relations between state and religion from the point of view of Islam 
also vary. These differences do not merely stem from the interpretation of 
religious teachings, but are also a result of the historical and social realities 
of each country.4 In Indonesia, there are at least three positions: secularist, 
traditionalist, and reformist.5 Secularists restrict Islam as a religion to the 
regulation of the relationship between humans and God, not involving it in 
the regulation of public or state affairs. In this view, the state is entirely un-
der man’s authority and is distinct from religion; politics becomes a public 
secular affair, whereas religion is understood as a private affair.6
Traditionalists7 believe that Islam is an all-encompassing religion, regu- 
lating all aspects of human life including the state system (al-Islam din wa 
daulah). Since Muslims are supposed to follow the law and principles of 
Islam, they are required to establish an Islamic state that totally adopts 
 
2 Natalie Goldstein, Global Issues: Religion and the State (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 
2010), 6–7.
3 Rahmatunnair, “Paradigma Formalisasi Hukum Islam di Indonesia,” Jurnal Ahkam XII, 
no. 1 (2012): 101.
4 Abdul Salam Arief, “Relasi Agama dan Negara Dalam Perspektif Islam,” Herméneia 2, no. 
2 (2003): 279.
5 Siti Musdah Mulia, “Menuju Kebebasan Beragama di Indoneisa,” in Kebebasan Beragama 
Atau Berkepercayaan Di Indonesia, ed. Chandra Setiawan and Asep Mulyana (Jakarta: 
Komnas HAM, 2006), 41.
6 Mulia, “Menuju Kebebasan Beragama di Indoneisa,” 41.
7 Hefner describes the traditionalists’ stance as ‘statist Islam’. Robert W. Hefner, Civil Is-
lam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 218. In the present article, this group will be called the Islamist group. This group 
wants Islam as the state foundation and fights for the formalisation of Islamic law as state 
law. This group is rooted in two Islamic movements, namely Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun 
and Jamaat-i-Islami. See Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and 
Pragmatism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 6.
5Sharia law8 with regard to both family law (al-ahwalal-syakhsiyah) and 
criminal law (hudud).9
Reformists’ ideas differ from those of both secularists and tradition- 
alists. Reformists argue that Islam is a religion that provides absolute regu- 
lations regarding man’s relationship with God, but only basic principles 
when it comes to society. As such, reformists argue that there is space for 
human beings to establish their own law on social behaviour and relation-
ships.10
Mirjam Künkler outlines three characteristics of the dynamics of 
the relationship between the state and Islam in Indonesia. First, although 
constitutional constructions are key to state-religion relations, extra- 
8 The concepts of Sharia, Islamic law, and Islamic teachings often blur. Sharia is the teach-
ing of Islam covering all aspects of human life, namely morals, laws, beliefs, and attitudes. 
Islamic law is part of Sharia and often also called fiqh. Sharia is different from fiqh. Sharia 
is created by Allah (and Rasulullah) and is universal and valid throughout the ages. Fiqh 
is the result of humanity’s understanding and interpretation of Sharia as contained in the 
Qur’an and Sunnah when confronted with human behaviour. Therefore, fiqh is based on 
Sharia. Sharia is implemented through fiqh, which consists of scholars’ understanding of 
Sharia. However, the term Sharia is often used to refer to the legal and fiqh aspects. The 
phrase “application of Sharia” is used to refer to the application of Islamic law or fiqh. See, 
Muhammad Zuhri, Hukum Islam dalam Lintasan Sejarah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Per-
sada, 1996), 1–5; Joko Mirwan Muslimin, Islamic Law and Social Change: A Comparative 
Study of the Institutionalization and Codification of Islamic Family in the Nation-States 
Egypt and Indonesia (1950–1995), Dissertation thesis Hamburg University (Hamburg, 
2005), 3.
Husein Muhammad writes that Islam is din, Sharia (al-syari’ah), and morals. Din is belief 
in God Almighty and eschatological life. Sharia is the way or rule of life. Morals are ethics 
or akhlaq. Al-Din and al-akhlaq are universal. Sharia is contextual and diverse. See, K. H. 
Husein Muhammad, “Hukum Islam yang Tetap dan Yang Berubah,” in Islam Nusantara: 
dari Ushul Fiqh Hingga Konsep Historis, ed. Akhmad Sahal and Munawir Azis (Bandung: 
Mizan, 2016), 98.
Adnan Qohar argues that the term “Islamic law” is a typical Indonesian term and a trans-
lation of al-fiqh al-Islaami or in some contexts, a translation of al-syarii’a al-Islaami. In 
the Qur’an, the term Islamic law (al-hukm al-Islaami) cannot be found, but the term 
Sharia can be. In Indonesia, “Islamic law” refers to the rules derived from revelation that 
are formulated into four legal forms, namely fiqh, fatwas, court decisions, and state laws. 
See Adnan Qohar, “Bingkai Rasionalisasi Pembaruan Hukum Islam Indonesia tentang 
Kedudukan Perempuan,” in Menggugat Stagnasi Pembaruan Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 
ed. M. Sutomo and Ahmad Zaenal Fanani (Jakarta: UII Press, 2016), 258.
In An-Naim’s view, Sharia is always a product of ijtihad since it is based on human un-
derstanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah through a process of reasoning and reflection. 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 13.
9 Mulia, “Menuju Kebebasan Beragama di Indoneisa,” 41.
10 Mulia, 41. Joko Mirwan Muslimin, Islamic Law and Social Change, 16.
6constitutional politics play a significant role over time. Künkler notes that 
“constitutional moments” define religion-state relations, but “normal poli-
tics” leave much room for manoeuvre. Second, colonial legacies of law have 
established a relationship between the state and religion. In Indonesia, the 
secularisation and standardisation of criminal law under the Dutch colo-
nial government moved the country away from the possibility of Islamic 
public law. Additionally, the Japanese occupation regime provided the ad-
ministrative basis for today’s state-religion arrangements with the estab-
lishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Third, there is a view that 
Pancasila’s flexibility (so-called “constitutional ambiguity”) is an attempt to 
avoid a decision on the controversial issue of the status of Islam within the 
state. However, the rejection of the provision that Islamic law would apply 
to all Muslims in the final version of the 1945 Constitution is actually a 
commitment to the nation-state.11
Socio-political Dynamics
Indonesian society has long been diverse, both from an ethnic and a re-
ligious perspective. Originally, the many local ethnic groups in Indone-
sia adhered to belief systems that can be subsumed under animism.12 The 
establishment of Hinduism and Buddhism from the 3rd century BCE did 
not change this diversity because these religions did not displace the old 
beliefs, but instead widened the religious landscape with the emergence 
of syncretist beliefs. When Hinduism and Buddhism became the domi-
nant religions of the pre-colonial kingdoms on the Indonesian archipelago, 
every kingdom developed different regulations and structures concerning 
royal affairs and religious affairs.13
Islam arrived in Indonesia peacefully through two different processes. 
First, through trade channels from India and Persia, whose mystical Islam 
11 Mirjam Künkler, “Constitutionalism, Islamic Law, and Religious Freedom in Postinde-
pendence Indonesia,” in Constitution Writing, Religion and Democracy, ed. Asli Ü. Bali 
and Hanna Lerner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 180–81.
12 Tedi Kholiludin and Kuasa Negara Atas Agama, Politik Pengakuan, Diskursus “Agama 
Resmi”, dan Diskriminasi Hak Sipil (Jakarta: RaSAIL Media Group, 2009), 136.
13 Harry J. Benda, Bulan Sabit, and Matahari Terbit, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, 
Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945 (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 
1980), 27.
7easily acculturated to animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.14 As a result, 
in the 14th and 15th centuries, Islam became the official religion of the pre- 
colonial Indonesian kingdoms,15 which developed diverse, pluricentric 
social orders.16 Second, Islam’s relevance in Indonesia grew as a result of 
direct influence from Mecca through Indonesian hajj pilgrims, of whom 
there were more and more in the 19th century. In this phase, Islam aimed 
particularly to purify worship and put an end to syncretist beliefs.17 
The peaceful development of Islam generated different interpretations 
of and levels of commitment to Islam that influenced the formation of In-
donesia’s social structure, which Geertz later classified into three groups: 
abangan, priyayi, and santri.18 Within the political realm, this classification 
has its equivalents in the nationalist and the Islamist groups.19 Abangan 
and priyayi become the nationalist group whereas santri become the Isla-
mist group. The nationalist group developed within both the Budi Oetomo 
organisation (established in 1908) and the Indonesian Association of the 
Netherlands, which from 1924 began to determine that the goal of inde-
pendence should be based on four principles, namely national unity, soli- 
darity, non-cooperation between religion and state, and independence. The 
nationalist group supported the idea of separation of religion and state. Re-
ligion was regarded as a spiritual and personal affair, while the state was 
seen as a matter of the world and society. The state had neither authority 
to organise, nor to impose religion on its citizens. 
14 Nurcholish Madjid, Tradisi Islam: Peran dan Fungsinya dalam Pembangunan di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 7.
15 See Ernst Utrecht, “Religion and Social Protest in Indonesia,” Social Compass XXV, no. 
3–4 (1978): 397.
16 Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 14.
17 Gavin W. Jones, “Religion and Education in Indonesia,” Indonesia 22 (1976): 21. The 
number of Indonesian pilgrims had increased since 1858. Indonesia’s growing middle 
class – a result of the Dutch plantation system (cultuurstelsel) – gained the wealth needed 
to undertake the pilgrimage and changes in regulations also made performing the hajj 
easier. See M.C. Ricklefs, “Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java: Historical and 
Contemporary Rhymes,” in Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. 
Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of Sotheast Studies, 2008), 116–17.
18 Abangan and priyayi groups in Java mostly identify themselves as Muslims despite not 
practising Islamic teachings. They are often referred to as “statistical Muslims” or “nom-
inal Muslims”. They choose Islam because it is the most powerful religion in Java. See 
Joseph Tamney, “Modernization and Religious Purification: Islam in Indonesia,” Review 
of Religious Research 22, no. 2 (1980): 210; Utrecht, “Religion and Social Protest in Indo-
nesia,” 396.
19 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900–1942 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), vii.
8The Islamist group (mostly identical to santri) is comprised of two 
different Muslim groups, namely the traditionalist group and the mod-
ernist group.20 The traditionalist group was rooted in the Javanese Islamic 
tradition; its main organisation was the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).21 The 
modernist Islamic group consisted mainly of urban, middle-class Muslims 
who had received a modern education. Their primary organisation is still 
the Muhammadiyah.22
Indonesia’s pre-colonial kingdoms ended with the establishment of 
Dutch colonial rule in the 19th century. The Dutch implemented a policy of 
excluding religion from politics23 based on the argument that Islam could 
not play a constructive role in modernising Indonesian society. The policy 
also aimed to contain the political danger of Pan-Islamism. The Dutch policy 
was directed toward modernisation, secularisation, and Westernisation by 
limiting religion through customary institutions and the Western model of 
education.24
Islam became an essential part of Indonesian identity and a powerful 
resource for indigenous resistance against the Christian Western colo-
nists.25 Islam evolved into a political identity that dispelled local patriotism 
and created national unity,26 culminating in the formation of the Sarekat 
20 Ricklefs classifies the pious Muslim community into different groups, i.e. sharia- 
oriented reformers, Sufi reformers, adherents of the mystic synthesis, rural kiai, and 
followers of the messianic movement. See Ricklefs, “Religion, Politics and Social 
Dynamics in Java,” 117.
21 Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in 
Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 2.
22 R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” Jour-
nal of Asian Studies 55, no. 3 (1996): 622–23. Muhammadiyah was also influenced 
by the Pan-Islamic movement introduced by Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad 
Abduh, and Rasyid Ridha. Muslimin, Islamic Law and Social Change, 34; Greg Bar-
ton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam,” Politics & Policy 38, 
no. 3 (2010): 481.
23 Kholiludin, Kuasa Negara Atas Agama, 141–42.
24 Dietrich Jung, “ ‘Islam as a Problem’: Dutch Religious Politics in the East Indies,” Review 
of Religious Research 51, no. 3 (2010): 293–94.
25 Utrecht, “Religion and Social Protest in Indonesia,” 409. Islam as an identity in the fight 
against colonialism was influenced by the Pan-Islamism movement that arrived in In-
donesia through hajj pilgrims and the publications of reform groups, such as al- ‘Urwah 
al-Wutqa, al-Manar, and the local magazine al-Munir, which was published in West Su-
matra. Muslimin, Islamic Law and Social Change, 38.
26 Amry Vandenbosch, “Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia,” Far Eastern Survey 21, no. 
18 (1952): 182.
9Islam (SI)27 as a political organisation, as well as the Muhammadiyah and 
NU within the social sphere.
Both the nationalists and the Islamists rejected colonialism and fought 
for independence, although according to Benda, they have never been able 
to create a permanent coalition.28 From the emergence of the idea of an 
independent Indonesia, there were different opinions on the future state’s 
ideological foundation and thus on the relationship between the state and 
religion. While the nationalists favoured a secular nation-state, the Islam- 
ists wanted an Islamic state or at least Islam as the state’s ideological foun-
dation. This debate was conducted in the mass media towards the end of 
Dutch colonial rule and during the Japanese occupation.29
The debate on the state’s ideological foundation continued formally 
within the Preparation Agency for the Independence of Indonesia (BPUPKI). 
The BPUPKI meetings were conducted in two periods, from 28 May to 
1 June 1945 and from 10 to 17 July 1945. The Islamists – lead by Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo, K. H. Ahmad Sanusi, Kahar Muzakir, and K. H. A. Wachid 
Hasyim – not only proposed Islam as the state’s foundation and official 
religion, but also proposed that the state should be obliged to enforce 
Sharia law and that the president should be Muslim. The nationalist group 
proposed that the principles of nationalism, unity of Indonesia, kinship, 
democracy, just and civilised humanity, and divinity without mentioning 
a particular religion, should be the state’s foundational principles. Their 
leading figures were Radjiman, Sukarno, Muhammad Hatta, Supomo, 
Muhammad Yamin, Wongsonegoro, Sartono, Suroso, and Buntaran Mar-
toatmojo.30
In his speech to the BPUPKI on 1 June 1945 summarising the results of 
the meetings thus far, Sukarno outlined five basic principles as foundation-
al for future Indonesia: (1) Indonesian nationalism, (2) internationalism 
and humanity, (3) consensus within democracy, (4) social welfare, and 
27 Founded in Solo on 11 November 1912, Sarekat Islam grew from Sarekat Dagang Islam 
(Islamic Trade Union), which was founded on 16 October 1905. Noer, Gerakan Modern 
Islam di Indonesia 1900–1942, 115. The organisation not only changed its name but also 
shifted its focus from economic to political affairs. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Studi tentang 
Percaturan dalam Konstituante: Islam dan Masalah Keagamaan (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 
79; Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism, 70.
28 Bulan Sabit Benda and Matahari Terbit, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, 1942–1945, 67–68.
29 Budiyono, “Hubungan Negara dan Agama Dalam Negara Pancasila,” Fiat Justicia 8, no. 3 
(2014): 419.
30 Maarif, Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante, 103.
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(5) divinity. Putting nationalism first in this list indicated that Indonesia 
should become a nation-state.31 The divinity principle was the result of an 
understanding of Indonesian society as a religious one and was a tribute to 
the diversity of Indonesia’s religions. Sukarno’s speech, entitled “The Birth 
of Pancasila”, was the first time that the state’s foundational principles were 
called Pancasila, a combination of two old Javanese words, deriving from 
Sanskrit: pañca (five) and sīla (bases, principles).32 
After controversial discussions among the BPUPKI members in the 
first session in May 1945, a smaller committee – consisting of Sukarno, 
Muhammad Hatta, Agus Salim, A. A. Maramis, Muhammad Yamin, K. H. A. 
Wahid Hasyim, A. Subardjo, R. Abikoesno, and A. Kahar Muzakar – was es-
tablished.33 This Committee of Nine formulated the Jakarta Charter, the Indo-
nesian declaration of independence, which contains the state’s philosophical 
foundation. The Jakarta Charter was a compromise between the nationalists 
and the Islamists. The divinity principle was now put first and contained an 
explicit reference to Islam: “Belief in God, with the obligation to implement 
the Sharia of Islam for its adherents.”34 This phrasing would have made In-
donesia an Islamic nation-state that was obliged to ensure that Muslims im-
plemented Sharia law. The Pancasila now included the following principles:
(1) Principle of divinity (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa)
(2) Humanism/internationalism(Kemanusian/Internationalisme)
(3) National unity (Persatuan Indonesia)
(4) Democracy (Permusyawaratan/perwakilan)
(5) Social justice (Keadilan Sosial)
On the day after independence, 18 August 1945, the Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) promulgated the 1945 Con-
stitution with the Jakarta charter as its preamble. In spite of the previous 
31 I. Wangsa Widjaja and Meutia F. Swasono, Mohammad Hatta: Kumpulan Pidato II (Ja-
karta: Inti Idayu Press, 1983), 194.
32 See Sukarno’s speech to the BPUPKI on 1 June 1945. RM. A.B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Un-
dang-Undang Dasar 1945 (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indone-
sia, 2009), 300.
33 Kaelan, Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila: Kultural, Historis, Filosofis, Yuridis, dan Aktualisa-
sinya (Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 2013), 166.
34 Muhammad Yamin named the document the ‘Jakarta Charter’ (Piagam Jakarta). Sukar-
no, as Chair of the Committee of Nine, called it the ‘Mukaddimah’, while Soekiman called 
it the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 472. See 
also H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, M.A., Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 (Jakarta: Rajawali, 
1986), 32.
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heated debates and the laborious work to reach a compromise on the formu-
lation of the Pancasila, this version of the Jakarta Charter contained a fun-
damental change: The first sila had been changed from “Belief in God, with 
the obligation to implement the Sharia of Islam for its adherents” to “Belief in 
the one Almighty God”, omitting the Sharia part. The intention of the change 
of this first principle was to accommodate non-Muslim groups’ objections, 
especially from the Christian groups of Eastern Indonesia who threatened 
to secede from the new independent State of Indonesia. In addition to omit-
ting the phrase “with the obligation to implement the Sharia of Islam for 
its adherents” from the first principle of Pancasila, Muhammad Hatta also 
conveyed the amendment of the “Muslim” requirement for the President in 
Article 6 paragraph (1), and the change of Article 29 paragraph (1).35 However, 
the Indonesian 1945 Constitution does not mention the word ‘Islam’ at all.
Some Muslim groups still consider the change in the Jakarta Charter to 
be a betrayal. They belive that the omitting of the Sharia phrase from the 
Pancasila’s first principle is influenced by the pressure from non-Muslim 
groups. It should also be noted that Islamist groups only accepted the 
change because Sukarno promised them that the constitution was prelimi- 
nary and they would have the opportunity to strive for Islam to be named 
the state’s foundation in the new constitution. The new constitution was 
to be passed by the still to be elected Indonesian parliament, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR).36 In 1955, the MPR established a Constitu-
tional Assembly in order to renegotiate the relations between state and re-
ligion and revise the 1945 Constitution. Since the Constitutional Assembly 
could not agree on the matter of the religious foundation of the Indonesian 
state, it was ultimately dissolved by President Sukarno with the Decree of 
5 July 1959. Sukarno then re-enacted the 1945 Constitution.
Indonesia’s socio-political conditions during Sukarno’s period of of-
fice (disparagingly dubbed the ‘Old Order’ by his successor Suharto) con-
tinued to reflect the differences between Islamist and nationalist groups. 
Islamists were affiliated with Muslim parties, especially Masyumi. Masyumi 
was founded in November 1945, and supported by both traditionalist and 
35 Muhamad Hisyam, “Ki Bagus Hadikusumo dan Problem Relasi Agama – Negara,” Jurnal 
Masyarakat dan Budaya 13, no. 2 (2011): 22.
36 Simon Butt, “Islam, the State and the Constitutional Court in Indonesia,” Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal 19, no. 2 (2010): 282; Faisal Ismail, Panorama Sejarah Islam dan Politik 
di Indonesia: Sebuah Studi Komprehensif (Jakarta: IRCiSoD, 2017), 66–67.
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modernist Islamic groups in Indonesia. Due to its federal character, it was 
able to integrate all Islamic political streams, but, for the same reason, was 
always weak and threatened in its unity. Traditionalist groups (NU) and 
modernist groups (Persis and Muhammadiyah) often had different views 
and interests with the result that the NU ultimately declared its separa-
tion from Masyumi and became an independent political party in 1952.37 
The nationalist group was affiliated with nationalist and socialist parties, 
especially the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Indonesian Com-
munist Party (PKI).38 In addition, there were several smaller national-
ist and religious parties, such as the People’s Consultative Party (Murba), 
the Muslim Association Party (PSII), and the Indonesian Christian Party 
(Parkindo).
In the 1955 election, the power of the Islamist and nationalist groups 
was relatively balanced.39 The nationalist camp (PNI, PKI, Parkindo, Catho-
lic Party, PSI40, and IPKI41) won 253 seats (52.8% of the votes) and the Is-
lamist group (Masyumi, NU, PSSI, and Perti) gained 226 seats (47.2%).42 
In the years after the failure and dissolution of the Constitutional As-
sembly in 1959, the tensions between Islamist, nationalist and commun- 
ist groups increased dramatically: Islamists were opposed to communist 
groups,43 who were closer to the nationalist groups. The Islamists became 
closer to the military,44 which began to enter the political arena and gained 
strength as civil society powers were weakened by the political conflicts.45 
The communist group opposed the military elite. 
37 Muslimin, Islamic Law and Social Change, 116; Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular 
Democracy, and Islam,” 480.
38 Daniel S. Lev, Peradilan Agama Islam di Indonesia (Islamic Courts in Indonesia) (Jakarta: 
Intermasa, 1980), 303.
39 Muchamad Ali Safa’at, Pembubaran Partai Politik: Pengaturan dan Praktik Pembubaran 
Partai Politik Dalam Pergulatan Republik (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2011), 137.
40 Indonesia Socialist Party.
41 The Indonesia Independent Fighter Association. 
42 Miriam Budiardjo, Partisipasi dan Partai Politik: Sebuah Bunga Rampai (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Obor Indonesia, 1998), 234 and 256.
43 The conflict between santri and communist abangan was mainly rooted in the PKI’s land 
reform campaign and culminated in the PKI rebellion in Madiun in 1948. See Ricklefs, 
“Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java,” 121–22.
44 In this period, the military were participant-rulers who shared power with the president 
while confronting the rising influence of the communist movement. Marcus Mietsner, 
Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Demo-
cratic Consolidation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 13.
45 Marcus Mietzner, “Veto Player No More? The Declining Political Influence of the Mil-
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Within the Islamic camp, a process of radicalisation took place, during 
which the more modernist Masyumi intensified contact with Darul Islam, 
a rather radical Islamist group that wanted to establish an Islamic state. 
Darul Islam had founded the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in 1948 in West 
Java. In 1960, the NII was involved in the armed PRRI and Permesta Re-
bellion against the central government’s policy towards indigenous groups 
in East and West Indonesia.46 After the government had crushed the re-
bellion, the President’s Decree Number 200 of 1960 dissolved Masyumi on 
17 August 1960, deeming it an NII collaborator. This was the beginning of 
the decline of Islamist political power in Indonesia.
Following the dissolution of Masyumi and the declining role of political 
parties in general in the first half of the 1960s, there were only three major 
political powers left in Indonesia: the Communist Party (PKI), the military, 
and President Sukarno himself.47 The acme of the conflict between the PKI 
and the army was the abduction and killing of six army generals in the 
early hours of 1 October 1965.48 This became known as the Thirtieth of 
September Movement (G30S). 49 Although there is still scholarly and politi-
cal debate both within and outside Indonesia regarding who masterminded 
the killings, both the army and religious groups accused the PKI of being 
responsible for and involved in this attempted coup d’état. General Suharto 
subsequently conducted a campaign to purge Indonesian society of the 
PKI. Around half a million members and sympathisers of the PKI were 
killed by the army, countless were arrested. This marked the end of the 
itary in Postauthoritarian Indonesia,” in Democracy and Islam in Indonesia, ed. Mirjam 
Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 92–93.
46 Vandenbosch, “Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia,” 183. The PRRI rebellion and 
the Permesta rebellion occurred in 1957 in the East (Permesta) and West (PRRI) of In-
donesia. Both rebellions were directed against the central government’s policy towards 
ethnic groups and the suppression of their regional autonomy. In February 1958, both 
rebellions unified. The central government’s troops beat the revolutionary troops in June 
1958. However, Permesta guerrilla fighters remained active until an amnesty in 1961.
47 According to Alfian, the rise of the military as a political force was due to the loss of 
political parties balancing against the PKI. Alfian argues that the PKI needed Sukarno 
to protect its political activities while the military needed Sukarno to legitimise its po-
litical function. Sukarno needed the PKI to counterbalance the military and needed the 
military to support his guided democracy. See, Alfian, Pemikiran Dan Perubahan Politik 
Indonesia (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1992), 40–41.
48 Robert W. Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” in “Religion and 
Globalization at the Turn of the Millennium,” ed. José Casanova, special issue, Sociology 
of Religion 62, no. 4 (2001): 501.
49 Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” 502.
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political power of communism in Indonesia and the start of efforts to ban 
the spread of communism (and atheism) as a movement as well as an ideo- 
logy. In the course of the PKI purge, both traditionalist and modernist 
Muslims engaged with the military, driven by long-standing conflicts with 
the PKI and the hope of regaining Islamist political power in a new era.50 
Following the suppression of the coup d’état and the military massacres of 
(supposed) communists, General Suharto thus led the traditionally con-
servative armed forces in a successful coup against President Sukarno.
Suharto called his regime the ‘New Order’, claiming that he would im-
plement Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in a pure and consequent 
manner. While the New Order was marked by mass de-politicisation and 
enforced ideological hegemony, it also provided socio-political and eco-
nomic stability through state corporatism. State politics affected almost 
every aspect of people’s lives, including their religious lives.51 Public reli-
gious activities were suppressed systematically and there was an attempt 
to restrict religion exclusively to the private realm. Though worship in the 
public sphere was still permitted, it had to be on the state’s terms. Fur-
thermore, the activities of religious organisations were strictly limited to 
the social sphere and excluded from the political arena.52 Islamists initial-
ly hoped for a greater political role under the New Order in return for 
having supported the military in defeating communism.53 However, these 
hopes were disappointed and Muslim organisations were also suppressed 
and marginalised. The military distrusted Islamists in light of their in-
volvement in the PRRI and Permesta Rebellions in 1960, as they had be-
trayed two main principles of the national political identity, namely multi- 
religiosity and territorial integrity.54
The removal of ideology from political party policies and the establish-
ment of Pancasila as the sole principle of all political parties resulted in a 
simplification of Indonesia’s political landscape under President Suharto. 
50 See Olle Törnquist, “Muslim Politics and Democracy: The Case of Indonesia,” Journal of 
Indonesian Islam 1, no. 1 (2007): 8.
51 Marzuki Wahid, Fiqh Indonesia: Kompilasi Hukum Islam dan Counter Legal Draft Kompi-
lasi Hukum Islam dalam Bingkai Politik Hukum Indonesia (Cirebon: Institut Studi Islam 
Fahmina, 2014), 149.
52 Syafiq Hasyim, State and Religion: Considering Indonesian Islam as Model of Democrati-
sation for the Muslim World (Berlin: Liberales Institut, 2013), 17.
53 Muslim groups primarily became involved for political and economic reasons rather 
than religious ones. Törnquist, “Muslim Politics and Democracy” 8.
54 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia,” 621.
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Only three parties remained: the ruling Golkar55; the United Development 
Party (PPP), which was the result of a merger of several Islamic parties; and 
the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), which was the result of a merger of 
several nationalist parties.56 
Suharto pursued a kind of political secularisation in different ways. In 
addition to the suppression of public religious activities, and restrictions on 
the political participation of parties with religious foundations, Golkar also 
tried to abandon religion symbolically. For example, the PPP was made to 
replace its symbol – an image of the Kaaba – with the symbol of Pancasila, a 
star. Gradually, the PPP’s Muslim foundations were to be weakened and the 
party itself turned into a party with a national ideology and symbol, namely 
Pancasila.57 The change in the PPP’s principles and symbol deprived the party 
of its identity as an Islamic party, meaning the distinction between Islamist 
and nationalist parties no longer applied. Golkar established various periph-
eral organisations to accommodate Islamic groups, including the Indonesian 
Mosque Council and the Islamic Communication Forum of Islamic Organisa-
tions.58 The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) pursued the same strategy 
and founded an Islamic wing called Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (BMI).
This renewed transformation of the political landscape was paralleled 
by an ideological change within the Muslim communities, which no longer 
perceived religion as the sole determining factor when making political 
choices. The NU and Muhammadiyah distanced themselves and no longer 
participated in politics. In the 1977 election, the NU was still part of the PPP 
but in 1984 reverted to their original identity, i.e. as a social organisation 
which was not involved in practical and electoral politics.59 Consequently, 
members of the NU and Muhammadiyah were free to make their political 
choice without being directed to affiliate with certain political parties.
55 Golkar was originally set up by Sukarno as an organisation to unify people from a num-
ber of occupational and other groups in Indonesian society. Sukarno’s intention was to 
replace the role of political parties, which in his view caused social disintegration. In the 
New Order era, Golkar became a functional group, which was used by the state and the 
military to intervene in the political arena. Utrecht, “Religion and Social Protest in Indo-
nesia,” 405; Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia,” 627.
56 Daniel Dhakidae, “Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut Partai 
Politik,” Prisma, no. 9 (1981): 34.
57 Hasyim, State and Religion: Considering Indonesian Islam as Model of Democratisation for 
the Muslim World, 20–21.
58 Künkler, “Constitutionalism, Islamic Law, and Religious Freedom,” 199.
59 Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia, 
2 and 67.
16
Under ongoing pressure from the New Order, the Muslim community 
divided into two groups, neither of which were fiercely opposed to state 
policy. Both groups engaged in social activities with different strategies and 
objectives. The first group conducted missionary endeavours (da’wah) by 
maintaining the idea of an Islamic state, and, among other things, by estab-
lishing the Council of Islamic Da’wah Indonesia (DDII), led by Mohammad 
Natsir, in 1967, and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), in 1975.60 Due 
to state pressure, extremist religious movements were forced to shift to un-
derground activities.61
The second group consisted mainly of younger Muslims with mod-
ern educational backgrounds. This group supported the civil-democratic 
Islamic reform movement. It was not linked to a particular political party 
and did not want to be associated with the old Islamist groups, even calling 
the idea of an Islamic state a myth. The agenda of civil society groups was 
to strengthen Indonesian civil society, with a focus on justice, freedom and 
social autonomy.62 The group was influenced by the thinking of Nurcholish 
Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid.63
Nurcholish Madjid used the idea of secularisation in the sense of de- 
sacralisation of everything different from the truly divine (transcendental). 
Secularisation in this sense thus did not mean the removal of religious ori-
entation from the norms and values of society, but a radical de-valuation 
of that which is part of the religious sphere.64 The state is perceived as part 
of the worldly sphere rather than part of the divine. It should be secular in 
the sense that it always refers to religious and ethical values, but is never 
legitimised by a divine truth. Consequently, Muslims should explore the 
ethical values of Islamic teachings, but should not identify the state with 
religion, which would lead to the state’s sacralisation.65
Abdurrahman Wahid argued that Islam as a way of life (Sharia) does 
not have a clear concept of the state.66 The Islamic teachings consist of 
60 Ricklefs, “Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java,” 122.
61 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia,” 624.
62 Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” 505; Hefner, Civil Islam: 
Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 12–13.
63 Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam,” 471 and 473.
64 Nurcholish Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi 
Umat,” in Islam Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan, ed. Nurcholish Madjid (Bandung: Mi-
zan, 1993), 208.
65 Azyumardi Azra, Islam Substantif (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 313.
66 Abdurrahman Wahid, Islamu Islam Anda Islam Kita: Agama Masyarakat Negara 
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basic values that underlie people’s lives – justice, equality, and democracy 
– and operational frameworks, such as the notion that “the actions of the 
people’s leaders are determined by the welfare and prosperity of the 
people” (tasharruf al-imam ‘ala ra‘iyyatihi manuth bi al-mashlahah). He 
argued that the Islamic worldview (Weltanschauung) consisted of values 
and operational principles and that Islam accommodates social practices 
as long as these are to the benefit of the people.67 Consequently, accord-
ing to Wahid, leadership that is not oriented towards justice and welfare is 
at odds with the Islamic worldview.68 According to Wahid, Pancasila and 
religion have to be positioned functionally and clearly within their mu-
tual relationship: Pancasila cannot displace religion and religion in turn 
must be formulated in a way that is compatible with Pancasila. Pancasila is 
seen as the rule of the game that should connect all religions and beliefs of 
Indonesian society and, for this reason, has to treat all religions equally in 
law and society.69
These socio-political and philosophical changes within the Muslim 
community were influenced by processes of modernisation and urbani-
sation in the New Order era. On the one hand, modernisation enhanced 
a purification process in the sense of distinguishing between religious and 
non-religious realms and strengthened the abandonment of syncretic prac-
tices by rejecting ‘irrational’ magical practices.70 On the other hand, edu-
cational efforts and the process of urbanisation also fostered autonomous 
political and religious thinking.71 The increase in ideological autonomy 
was rooted in particular in the increasing quality of Islamic higher edu-
cation institutions, which were established from the 1960s to accommo-
date those leaving Islamic high schools (Madrasah Aliyah) and tradition-
al boarding schools (pesantren). After the curriculum changes in 1973 in 
particular, Islamic higher education was oriented towards more dynamic 
Islamic studies, able to explore the relevance of various Islamic thoughts to 
the conditions of Indonesia.72 
Demokrasi (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 81–84.
67 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Pribumisasi Islam,” in Islam Nusantara: Dari Ushul Fiqh Hingga 
Konsep Historis, ed. Akhmad Sahal and Munawir Azis, 44.
68 Wahid, Islamu Islam Anda Islam Kita, 96–99.
69 Wahid, 96–99.
70 Tamney, “Modernization and Religious Purification,” 207.
71 Tamney, “Established Religiosity in Modern Society,” 126.
72 Mirjam Künkler, “How Pluralist Democracy Became the Consensual Discourse Among 
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The modernisation of public education, now combining the teaching 
of religious and non-religious knowledge,73 led to a change in religious 
consciousness in Indonesia. As the national curriculum required religious 
instruction in all public schools, ‘pure’ Islamic worldviews increased and 
syncretist beliefs declined, which can be seen as a process of religionisa-
tion.74 At the same time, by strengthening the acceptance of the Pancasila, 
the view became dominant that creating an Islamic society was different 
from establishing an Islamic state. Education thus contributed to medi-
ating between and accommodating the diverse religious communities in 
Indonesia. Education in the New Order era changed the positions of the 
socio-political landscape with regard to religious and state relations, par-
ticularly the grouping of Islamists and nationalists.75 As a result of religious 
courses in public schools and modern Islamic education, many individuals 
and families who had been abangan became santri in terms of obedience 
and religious piety, but their political insights remained nationalist. Ad-
ditionally, the boundaries between modernist and traditionalist Islamic 
groups blurred. While the NU and Muhammadiyah still had different 
religious traditions, there was increasing mutual acceptance of these dif-
ferences.76 The changes in the Muslim communities can also be seen in 
the formation of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI), 
which was not fully supported by all Muslims. Nurcholish Madjid and 
Abdurrahman Wahid did not join the association. The ICMI was more a so-
cial empowerment group than a political one and consequently supported 
the emerging civil society.77
Secular and Nonsecular Muslims in Indonesia,” in Democracy and Islam in Indonesia, ed. 
Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 57–58; 
Künkler, “Constitutionalism, Islamic Law, and Religious Freedom,” 197.
73 The modernisation of education affected not only the curricula but also the management 
of schools. The traditional Islamic education at boarding schools (pesantren) was gener-
ally replaced by modern education managed by both the state and private organisations, 
who combined general and religious education. Gavin W. Jones, “Religion and Education 
in Indonesia,” 41.
74 See also: Markus Dressler, “Modes of Religionization: A Constructivist Approach to 
Secularity,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, 
Beyond Modernities” 7 (Leipzig University, 2019).
75 Tamney, “Modernization and Religious Purification,” 207 and 208; Tamney, “Established 
Religiosity in Modern Society,” 126.
76 Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia,” 623.
77 Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 152.
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In 1998, after long-lasting student protests and against the backdrop 
of Indonesia’s desolate economic situation following the 1997 Asian finan-
cial crisis, Suharto had to resign after 32 years in power. 78 The New Order 
era was followed by a phase of democratic reforms, the so-called Refor-
mation Era (Era Reformasi). While some people linked to the old regime 
did use Islamist hardliners to create chaos in certain regions,79 Indonesia’s 
successful democratic transition owes a lot to the supportive role of Islamic 
leaders and civil society,80 among others Amin Rais of the Muhammadiyah, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, and Nurcholish Madjid.81
As a result of changes in the Muslim community, particularly the de-
creasing number of Islamists and nationalists and the growing number 
of santri, and the de-ideologisation of the political parties during the 
New Order, the political divide between the nationalist and the Islamist 
camp no longer applied. Baswedan – a political scientist and the present 
Governor of Jakarta – classified the political parties in the reform period 
into four categories: secular exclusive, secular inclusive, Islam inclusive, 
and Islamist. The secular exclusive party – for Baswedan the PDI-P – re-
jects the accommodation of a political agenda inspired by Islamic teachings 
within state policy. Secular inclusive parties like Golkar and the Democrat 
Party (PD) aim for the Islamic agenda to be accommodated within the poli- 
tics of a religiously neutral state. Islam inclusive parties like the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) and the Nation Awakening Party (PKB) are based 
on Pancasila and also have close links with Islamic organisations, such as 
NU and Muhammadiyah. They promote religious pluralism and reject the 
establishment of an Islamic state. Finally, Islamist parties openly support 
the establishment of an Islamic state. Parties in this category are PKS, PBB, 
78 Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Detik-Detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia 
Menuju Demokrasi (Jakarta: THC Mandiri, 2006), 7.
79 Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization,” 508. This conflict led to the 
loss of around 10,000 lives. The violence was exacerbated when 7,000 trained fanatic 
militias from Laskar Jihad in Java led by Ja’far Umar Thalib entered the conflict. Trained 
fighters under the command of Jemaah Islamiyah who had relations with al Qaeda were 
also involved in the conflict. See Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and 
Islam,” 477; Sidney Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 
1998,” in Democracy and Islam in Indonesia, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 114.
80 Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, 12–13.
81 Barton, “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam,” 471 and 473.
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and PPP.82 However, the Baswedan classification has weaknesses when it 
comes to distinguishing exclusive and inclusive secular parties because in 
reality, there is no exclusive secular party in terms of both political princi-
ples and practices. The PDI-P, which Baswedan classified as exclusive secu- 
lar, does not explicitly reject a political agenda inspired by Islamic teach-
ings: In some regions, for example, PDI-P representatives have not rejected 
the formation of local Islamic laws and more generally, the PDI-P more 
often forms coalitions with the Islamic parties PKB and PPP.
Based on the principles and character of each political party in the Refor- 
mation Era, the more appropriate classifications would be: (1) nationalist 
parties, (2) nationalist parties rooted in Muslim organisations, and (3) Isla- 
mic parties. Here, nationalist parties should be regarded as distinct from 
the old nationalist group. The Reformation Era’s nationalist parties no lon-
ger idealise the secular state; they accommodate the aspirations of Muslim 
groups as long as they do not conflict with Pancasila.
A number of new Islamist political parties were established at the be-
ginning of the Reformation Era. In total, 184 new political parties formed 
in the lead up to the 1999 general election, of which only 48 met the re-
quirements to participate in the election. A third of these parties said they 
were based on Islam. Some studies argue that political parties competing in 
the 1999 election were the legacy of the political flow of the 1955 election. 
In the 1999 election, the nationalist parties were the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDI-P),83 Golkar, the Justice and Unity Party (PKP),84 
and the Nation Love Democracy Party (PDKB).85 Nationalist parties rooted 
82 Sunny Tanuwidjaja, “Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing 
the Evidence of Islam’s Political Decline,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010): 42.
83 The PDI-P is a nationalist party that has its roots in the PNI which merged with other 
nationalist parties in the New Order era to become the PDI. The PDI-P was founded due 
to the internal conflict within the PDI, triggered by state intervention to reject Megawati, 
the daughter of Sukarno, as President of the PDI, despite her election to that position. 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/422453/profil-partai-demokrasi-indonesia-perjuan-
gan-pdip.
84 Indonesia’s Justice and Unity Party was founded by retired nationalist military and ad-
ministrative leaders, including Try Sutrisno, Edy Sudrajat, Sutiyono, Siswono Yudho-
husodo, and Hayono Isman. http://www.antaranews.com/berita/422116/profil-par-
tai-keadilan-dan-persatuan-indonesia-pkpi.
85 The Democracy and Love Nation Party is a Christian political party founded by Manase 
Mallo and Seto Harjanto. http://www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/Indonesian_Elections/
Indo-pemilu99/14pdkb.htm.
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in Muslim organisations were the National Mandate Party (PAN)86 and 
the Nation Awakening Party (PKB).87 The Islamist parties included PPP, 
The Crescent Star Party (PBB),88 the Justice Party (PK),89 and the Nahdlat-
ul Ummah Party (PNU).90 This constellation underwent several changes 
in every election until 2014, when nationalist parties included the PDI-P, 
Golkar, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra),91 the Democratic 
Party (PD),92 the Democratic Nationalist Party (Nasdem),93 and the People’s 
Conscience Party (Hanura).94 The PAN and the PKB were still the na-
tionalist parties that were rooted in Muslim organisations. The Islamist 
parties included the PPP and the PKS. In the elections between 1999 and 
2014, there was no significant change in the number of votes won by these 
three groups. In the 1999 election, nationalist parties won 285 seats in the 
86 The National Mandate Party was founded in August 1998 by Amien Rais. The PAN 
describes itself as a party that is open to all, however its leaders and members are primar-
ily from the Muhammadiyah. Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in 
Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation, 256.
87 The Nation Awakening Party was founded by the NU’s leaders to accommodate the inter-
nal political aspirations of the NU. Similar to the PAN, the PKB describes itself as being 
open to all, but the majority of its members and leaders are from the NU. Bush, Nahdlatul 
Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia, 120–22.
88 Muslims who had connections to the Masyumi leaders, among others, Yusril Ihza Ma-
hendra, M.S. Kaban, and Anwar Harjono, founded the Crescent and Star Party at the be-
ginning of the Reformation Era. The PBB was projected to be the successor of Masyumi. 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/422121/profil-partai-bulan-bintang-pbb.
89 The Justice Party changed its name to Justice and Prosperity Party in preparation for the 
2004 general elections. It was founded by university student activist alumni who had 
been part of an Islamic student movement in the New Order era and had established the 
Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, 
KAMMI) at the beginning of the Reformation Era. Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and 
the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation, 257.
90 The NU’s scholars K.H. Idam Chalid and K.H. Syukron Ma’mun, who disagreed with Ab-
durrahman Wahid, founded the Nahdlatul Ummah Party PKB. https://news.detik.com/
parpol/d-1059148/partai-persatuan-nahdlatul-ummah-indonesia-42.
91 The Great Indonesia Movement Party is a nationalist party founded by Prabowo Subianto, 
a fired army commander. http://partaigerindra.or.id/sejarah-partai-gerindra.
92 The Democrat Party is a nationalist party founded by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono before 
he was elected President in 2004. http://www.demokrat.or.id/sejarah/.
93 The Nationalist Democrat Party was founded by the media businessman Surya 
Paloh in February 2010. http://www.antaranews.com/berita/423235/profil-partai-nasi-
onal-demokrat-nasdem.
94 The nationalist People’s Conscience Party was founded in December 2006 by retired mil-
itary leaders including Wiranto, Bernard Kent Sondakh, Subagyo HS, Suaidi Marabesy, 
and Ary Mardjono. http://www.antaranews.com/pemilu/berita/422136/profil-partai-ha-
ti-nurani-rakyat-hanura.
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Indonesian Parliament, nationalist parties rooted in Muslim organisations 
won 85 seats, and Islamic parties won 83 seats. In the 2014 election, nation-
alist parties won 385 seats, nationalist parties rooted in Muslim communi-
ties won 96 seats, and the Islamic parties won 79 seats.
When it came to the formation of coalitions backing the candidates 
for President and Vice President, the distinction between nationalist par-
ties, nationalist parties rooted in Muslim organisations and Islamist parties 
did not apply. Coalitions were formed across party groups with the main 
competition being between the candidates from the nationalist parties. 
Liddle and Mujani have demonstrated that although religious orientation 
still played a role in the elections during the Reformation Era, its impact 
decreased tremendously. The political parties’ position on how a secu-
lar state could be shaped became the dominant factor behind the voters’ 
choice.95
Pancasila: Distinguishing between State and Religion
The Pancasila was formed by a process of public discourse and through the 
engagement of social movements. When the Indonesian nation’s founders 
agreed on the Pancasila, they combined Western notions of modernisa-
tion, democracy and Islam with local traditions and conditions. Accord-
ing to Kaelan, Indonesian nationalism was formulated eclectically from 
different indigenous and alien concepts. Notonagoro refers to this as “in-
corporated eclecticism”. Sukarno’s thinking, for example, was the product 
of a combination of Western democracy, Islamism, Marxism, Sun Yat Sen 
nationalism, Gandhi’s humanism, and the causa materialis of the Indone-
sian nation, namely the belief in God, humanity, and the spirit of mutual 
cooperation.96
Muhammad Yamin saw the historical roots of Indonesian nationalism 
in the pre-colonial kingdoms, describing the period of the Kingdom of 
Sriwijaya as first nationalism and that of the Kingdom of Majapahit as 
second nationalism. With the Indonesian motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, 
these periods established the notion of Indonesian unity in diversity.97
95 Liddle and Mujani, “Leadership, Party, and Religion,” 839–44.
96 Kaelan, Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila, 2–3.
97 Kaelan, Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila, 3.
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Soepomo referred to Western thinking as both individualist and col-
lectivist. The individualist ideas included those of Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Herbert Spencer, and Harold J. Laski, all 
of whom supported the notion that the state was created as the result of a 
social contract. The collectivist view was based on the theories of Karl 
Marx, Friedrich Engels, Lenin, Spinoza, Adam Muller, and Friedrich 
Hegel, for whom the state exists to ensure the interests of the whole society. 
Finally, he also adhered to an integralistic paradigm, aligned with the idea 
of the kinship of Indonesia.98
Another crucial element in the formation of Indonesian nationalism 
was Islam and Islamic organisations such as SI boosting the independence 
movement.99 Muslim leaders promoted the idea of an Indonesian state 
based on Islam, referring to Islamic thought that rejected the separation of 
state and religion. They did not consider the Islamic state to be a theocracy, 
but a divine democracy or a theo-democracy.100
From a constitutional perspective, the debates regarding ideas of a secu-
lar nation-state or an Islamic state occurred in several stages. At each stage, 
agreements were reached that had implications for the orientation of the 
state-religion distinction. The declaration of independence and promulga-
tion of the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila on 18 August 1945 should 
therefore not be understood as the final stage of an evolution that had been 
enforced by social change. Instead, social change, especially among Mus-
lims, occurred only after independence. This constrasts with Germany, for 
example, where the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 was preceded by 
fundamental social change through church reform, enlightenment,101 the 
Free Religious movement and the Kulturkampf.102
The first phase in the negotiation process in Indonesia was the agreement 
between the Islamist and nationalist groups on the formulation of Pancasila 
in the Jakarta Charter, which alluded to an Islamic state with its first principle 
98 Kaelan, Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila, 3–4.
99 Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900–1942, 115; Maarif, Studi tentang Perca-
turan dalam Konstituante, 79.
100 M. Natsir, “Persatuan Agama dan Negara,” in Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam, 
ed. M. Natsir (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 2001), 93.
101 Stefan Korioth and Ino Augsberg, “Religion and the Secular State in Germany,” in National 
Report: Germany, 321.
102 Todd H. Weir, Secularism and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Germany: The Rise of the 
Fourth Confession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 9–10.
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“Belief in God, with the obligation to implement the Sharia of Islam for its 
adherents”. This principle implied the absence of a separation of state and re-
ligion, but the state’s authority to act within the religious domain and use its 
power to ensure Muslims abide by Sharia law. This first agreement was not 
legally binding because it was reached prior to Indonesian independence.
The second phase was the agreement on the promulgation of the 1945 
Constitution by the PPKI on 18 August 1945. This included the preamble 
with the Pancasila and its first principle “Belief in the One Almighty God”. 
The omission of the phrase “with the obligation to implement the Sharia 
of Islam for its adherents” was thought to accommodate the aspirations 
of non-Muslim communities, while the addition of the phrase “Almighty 
God” was thought to accommodate the principle of Islamic monotheism.103 
In January 1946, the Indonesian government also established a Ministry 
of Religious Affairs in an effort to compensate the Islamist group for the 
omission of the reference to Sharia law.104 With this second agreement, the 
Indonesian state adhered to the principle of Belief in God without relat-
ing it to a particular religion. The state had no obligation or authority to 
ensure the implementation of religious teachings by their respective religious 
communities. Although this principle cannot simply be interpreted as the 
separation of state and religion, it affirms the existence of a distinction.
Germany’s Basic Law also begins with a nominatio dei, a mention of 
God’s name. The purpose, however, is more symbolic and serves to legi- 
timise the constitution by underlining that it has been written with an 
awareness of a responsibility not only to human beings but also to an 
authority that transcends humanity, namely God. The nominatio dei con-
firms that the power of the constitution-making body is not absolute and 
is thus intended to limit said power. When amendments were made to the 
Basic Law in the early 1990s after German reunification, there was an ini-
tiative to create a new opening that omitted the reference to God, but the 
Christian Democrat Party (CDU) which had a majority position in the Joint 
Constitutional Commission, did not support this. In the final report, the 
commission emphasised that human will is not an omnipotent, final au-
103 John A. Titaley, “Hubungan Agama dan Negara Dalam Menjamin Kebebasan Beragama 
di Indonesia,” in Kebebasan Beragama Atau Berkepercayaan Di Indonesia, ed. Chandra 
Setiawan and Asep Mulyana (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 2006), 21.
104 Government Decision No. 1 / S.D 1946. Kementerian Agama RI, Profil Kementerian 
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thority, and that precisely this is expressed by invoking one’s responsibility 
before God. Nevertheless, the phrase “responsibility before God” in the 
German Basic Law’s preamble is not a religious justification of the consti-
tution. It is related to Article 1, which is about the inalienable dignity of 
human beings and the duty of the state to protect human dignity.105 Human 
dignity does not exist only because of the will of the constitution-maker, 
but existed before the state.
The second phase of the Indonesian process was a provisional agree-
ment, since the 1945 constitution was intended from the outset as a tran-
sitional constitution. The Islamist group accepted this agreement only be-
cause of the promise that an Islamic state could be championed again after 
the constitution-forming bodies had been formed following the general 
election. As a consequence, the debate on the state’s founding principles 
re-emerged in the Constitutional Assembly of 1957–59 in a similar constel-
lation: the nationalists wanted to defend Pancasila and the Islamist group 
proposed Islam as the state’s foundation. The discussions were heavy and 
since no group had an absolute majority, no new agreement was reached. 
After this failed attempt to reformulate Indonesia’s founding principles, the 
government dissolved the Constitutional Assembly and proposed a return 
to the 1945 Constitution and upholding Pancasila for the sake of political 
stability; the government further proposed a shift from liberal democracy 
towards guided democracy.106 To accommodate the Islamist group, Presi- 
dent Sukarno’s decree of 5 July 1959 stated: “we believe that the Jakarta 
Charter of June 22, 1945 inspired the 1945 Constitution, and is part of 
a chain of unity with the Constitution”. Ismail Suny has argued that this 
statement confirms that Islamic law has an authoritative basis in the Indo-
nesian legal system.107
The Presidential Decree and the recognition of the Jakarta Char-
ter inspiring the 1945 Constitution constitute the third phase of the ne-
gotiating process regarding Pancasila. After this phase, the matter of the 
105 Tine Stein, “Constitution-Making and Religion in West Germany in the Shadow of State 
Failure,” in Constitution Writing, Religion and Democracy, ed. Asli Ü. Bali and Hanna 
Lerner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 79–83.
106 Konstituante Republik Indonesia, Risalah Perundingan Tahun 1959, Jilid 1, (Jakarta: 
Konstituante RI, 1959), 27.
107 Ismail Suny, “Kedudukan Hukum Islam dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia”, in Di-
mensi Hukum Islam Dalam Sistem Hukum Nasional, ed. Amrullah Ahmad et al. (Jakarta: 
Gema Insani Press, 1996), 133–34; Utrecht, “Religion and Social Protest in Indonesia,” 399.
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states’s founding principles was no longer debated in the legal constitu-
tional sphere. The position of Pancasila became even stronger during the 
New Order period, which firmly pursued a single-ideology policy in both 
political and social religious life.108 The state used Pancasila to legitimise its 
power and policies.
The debate surrounding Pancasila’s meaning, and especially the prin-
ciple of “Belief in the One Almighty God” arose for a fourth time in the 
late 1990s in the course of Indonesia’s democratisation process, and again 
focused on the relationship between state and religion. Based on Pan-
casila, state and religion are two separate entities, but there was still no 
agreed constitutional framework on whether they should be separated 
or not, and how their relationship should be shaped if they were not sepa- 
rated. Parallels can be drawn between this debate and the conflict be-
tween religion and the secular movements in the German Kulturkampf 
from 1871 onwards.109
In the Reformation Era, Islamic politics has shifted from the struggle 
to make Islam the state’s foundation to the struggle to implement Islamic 
law in state law through article 29 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. 
The debate moved from ideology to the realm of Muslims’ rights and the 
government’s obligation to apply Islamic law.110 The discussion surrounding 
the proposed amendment to article 29 took place from 1999 (first amend-
ment) to 2002 (fourth amendment). Despite this long negotiation process, 
the Indonesian parliament ultimately agreed not to put the amendments to 
a vote and to leave the article unchanged, as the two parties who supported 
the amendments (PBB and PPP) feared they would be defeated. It became 
clear that Islamic politics had lost influence for various reasons: (1) there 
was a lack of a single, unifying authority, (2) there was a lack of cohesion 
between the Islamic political parties and interest groups in which patronage 
relationships played a major role, and (3) the electoral system emphasised 
personal considerations over religious or ideological ones. According to 
Michael Buehler, the fragmentation of Islamic authority in Indonesian civil 
society is one of the main reasons why Islam and the nation-state are able 
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to combine in Indonesia, because agreements can be reached more easily 
and more pragmatically.111
The two most important functions of Pancasila are as the nation’s 
way of life and the state’s foundation. As a way of life, Pancasila is a moral 
aspiration involving the concept of the ideal life. As a state foundation, 
Pancasila is a manifestation of the national agreement on one unifying 
philosophy of government, which became the foundation of the mod-
ern democratic Indonesian state. In terms of legal theory, Pancasila is a 
Staatsfundamentalnorm. The principles of Pancasila form a pyramid- 
shaped hierarchical unity.112 The highest principle is the first one, the prin-
ciple of the “Belief in the One Almighty God”. This inspires the other prin-
ciples. God is the prima causa affecting humanity (second principle), na-
tionality (third principle), and state administration based on deliberation 
(fourth principle) to bring social justice (fifth principle).
The relationship between state and religion is inextricably linked 
with the influence of religions in the formation of national identity and 
resistance to the colonial regime. Islam has become a central element of 
Indonesian statehood and identity. It has not been limited to the private 
sphere, but has also become the spirit of managing public affairs. As the 
Indonesian people had not suffered the bitter experiences that Europeans 
had with regard to the relationship between religion and state, the Dutch 
colonial government’s policy of political secularisation and a religiously 
neutral state did not succeed in Indonesia.113
As an agreement, Pancasila symbolises a compromise between a secu- 
lar nation-state and an Islamic state. On the one hand, it affirms that the state 
is a separate organisation that is not a religious organisation. This means 
that the state remains in a profane or worldly territory with all its rules and 
devices being established and carried out secularly. However, the state’s ac-
tions, though agreed and executed secularly, can be influenced by reasons 
derived from religious teachings. The dynamic institutionalisation of Indo-
nesian secularity was affected by shifts in Pancasila’s meaning.114 Pancasila 
is the result of the attempt to overcome the problem of ethnic and religious 
111 Michael Buehler, “Islam and Democracy in Indonesia,” Insight Turkey (2009): 54.
112 Kaelan, Negara Kebangsaan Pancasila, 152.
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heterogeneity through integration and, in doing so, to achieve national unity. 
It is thus a form of secularity for the sake of national unity with the aim of 
achieving progress, independence and the welfare of Indonesian society.115
Although Pancasila does not produce secularism, it is the result of a 
cultural parallel to the political secularisation process before Indonesian 
independence.116 With Pancasila as the state’s foundation, religion was no 
longer ideologically dominant but had to compete with other views. Reli-
gious life became more of an individual choice, rather than one of national 
belonging. As a secular organisation, the state does not merge with any 
particular religious institution. Even if the state has the obligation to pro-
tect and facilitate religious life, each religion retains its own institutions and 
systems. Pancasila thus embraces the notion that the distinction between 
the realm of the state and the realm of religion is the root of modernisa-
tion and the rationalisation of political life.117 Religion and state are dis-
tinguished and closely interconnected at the same time: On the one hand, 
religion is a societal realm that has to be protected and facilitated by the 
state; on the other hand, religion can play a role in the state’s governance by 
strengthening social ethics and influencing state policies and laws through 
political and legal mechanisms. Theoretically, in this way religion becomes 
‘public religion’, distinct from the thesis of separation and privatisation, 
but still supporting the thesis of differentiation. Religion and state are not 
separated, but are distinguished by the limits of their respective authorities. 
We can describe this as ‘twin tolerations’.118
In order to achieve this situation of twin tolerations, the involvement 
of religious institutions in the political process must be subject to the prin-
ciples of public reason and deliberation. Religious teachings may be used 
to inspire the political process only if they are formulated in a way that 
reflects the rational nature of democratic deliberation. Simply quoting 
scriptural postulates is insufficient. A public decision is rational if it is 
based on facts, oriented towards the long-term public interest, and involves 
the participation of all groups. Nevertheless, quite often the success of a 
democratic decision-making process is decided first in the internal 
115 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, 890.
116 Rumadi, Sekularisasi Politik Dalam Pemilu 2014, Koran Sindo, April 23rd, 2014.
117 Ahmad Nur Fuad, “Sekularisasi Politik (Pengalaman Amerika Serikat dan Dunia Islam),” 
Salam 12, no. 2 (2009): 92.
118 Latif, Negara Paripurna, 43.
29
religious groups, even before a debate enters the rational and fact-oriented 
realm of the state. In these prior internal debates, arguments are not free 
but have to be rooted in a comprehensive religious doctrine.119
In Germany, church-state relations are characterised as an “amicable 
separation”120, or as Romero puts it, a soft version of secularism.121 The 
provisions of the Constitution of the former Weimar Republic (WRV), 
which Germany’s Basic Law refers to, balance separation and cooperation 
between the state and the religious communities. The state regards religious 
groups as autonomous corporations that regulate and manage their affairs 
independently within the bounds of the rule of law. Religious autono- 
my ends when it comes into conflict with other societal realms: For ex-
ample, religious groups cannot supersede the state’s authority by religious 
law.122 Despite the state’s religious neutrality, religion is still an integral part 
of the public domain.
In Indonesia, the Pancasila represents a symbiotic paradigm, according 
to which, state and religion are distinct but not strictly separated. This is the 
result of the debate between the integralist and secularist camp that lasted 
from before independence until Sukarno’s Presidential Decree of 5  July 
1959. In the Reformation Era, the discussion of the 1945 Constitution’s 
amendments has shifted from the confrontation between the integral-
ist and the secularist paradigm to a discussion about employing either 
the integralist or the symbiotic paradigm. Since its formulation in 1945, 
there has been increasing acceptance of Pancasila, and thus of the sym- 
biotic paradigm. Based on this paradigm, religious organisations have 
room to give state law a religious overtone. However, simply stating that 
they are giving a religious command is insufficient. They must ensure that 
what they formulate reflects the rational considerations inherent in the 
process of democratic deliberation.123 In contrast, in Germany, the impact 
of religious communities is limited to the social sphere.124
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The widespread acceptance of Pancasila in Indonesia’s predominantly 
Muslim society shows that at least the majority of Indonesians prefer re-
formist thought on the relationship between religion and the state. The 
traditionalist paradigm that supports the unification of religion and state is 
clearly rejected by the majority of Indonesian Muslims, as is the secularist 
paradigm that has not been a reference since the formulation of Pancasila 
with the first principle of “Belief in the One Almighty God”.
Pancasila is an open ideology125 that can be interpreted differently by all 
societal groups. There is no state monopoly on how one interprets Pancasila 
as this would result in dictatorship. However, the lack of a single legitimate 
interpretation results in uncertainty on the boundaries between the do-
mains of religion and the state. Each group draws these boundaries from 
its own perspective, and decides where and how the state has authority to 
regulate religion. State law is, of course, given primacy. However, since re-
ligion has room to influence state law, the state’s interpretation and law can 
be overridden by the interpretation of the majority. An example of this can 
be seen in the Blasphemy Law,126 which determines whether an action has 
deviated from the fundamental teachings of a certain religion. Here, the 
interpretation of the majority religious group outweighs the minority’s in-
terpretation. A further example is Indonesia’s Marriage Law,127 which de-
clares marriage as valid only if it is performed in line with the religion of the 
persons involved. The conditions for this being the case are determined by 
the dominant religious views. In the case of the Blasphemy Law, religion’s 
impact on the state via formal legal instruments is furthered by the fact 
that the Blasphemy Law only refers to the six officially recognised religions 
in Indonesia: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Confucianism. Local religions and beliefs that have not been officially 
recognised were subject to discrimination at least until the decision of the 
Constitutional Court Number 97/PUU-XIV/2016 that recognised belief 
and religion as separate but equal entities. Now the term ‘religion’ in the 
Civic Administration Law not only refers to officially recognised religions 
but also includes beliefs.
125 Madjid, Tradisi Islam, 14.
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As the state has to regulate religion, there is also space for state inter-
ventions in the realm of religion. The legal distinction between religion 
and belief, and the distinction between recognised and unrecognised reli-
gions are a form of massive state intervention in the religious domain. As 
the state is a secular institution, it is clear that the more state law governs 
the realm of religious life, the higher the potential for state interventions in 
the religious domain, which can be understood as an aspect of (intensified) 
secularisation. From this perspective, the communities’ adherence to reli-
gious law is no longer the result of their religious convictions, but of their 
compliance with state law as citizens.
As a point of comparison, the German Constitutional Court once 
defined ‘religion’ as “those confessions, which have in the course of time 
been developed by the civilised people on the basis of common moral con-
victions”. This definition is no longer used. Today, the notions of religion to 
which the Court refers are very general and open, for example “an assurance 
about the existence and the content of certain truths being connected to a 
human being.128 There are more concrete criteria for when religious com-
munities can be acknowledged as public corporations. They have to meet 
three criteria: (1) permanency, with regard to their number of members 
and their impact on society, (2) compliance with the law, as well as legal 
duties and obligations, and (3) loyalty to the state, namely a minimum of 
recognition of and respect for the state through acceptance of the state’s le-
gal system.129 There is currently debate in Germany about whether Islamic 
organisations can be recognised as public corporations, because Muslim 
organisations lack an overarching structure.130
In the case of Indonesia, An-Na’im argues that there is no sharp di- 
chotomy between an Islamic and a secular state because even Muslims re-
gard the state as a secular political institution. In Indonesia, secularism 
does not mean the exclusion of Islam from public life or its privatisation. 
Instead, a balance has been found with the institutionalisation of Islam 
and the state’s regulation of the limits within which Muslims can propose 
Sharia principles for adoption into state law and policy.131
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National Legal Policy on Islamic Law
Both state policy on Islamic groups and their legal aspirations evolved with 
the change of regimes in Indonesia. During the Old Order era, especially 
during the period of guided democracy from 1959–1965, the policy on 
Islamic groups altered from efforts to involve them in the process of found-
ing the state and its concept of democracy, to the state dissolving Masyumi. 
In this period, Sukarno more or less maintained the Dutch policy on reli-
gion, which aimed to control and oversee religion and religious activities.132
This policy changed during the New Order, which was characterised by 
both tolerance of the communities’ religious life and social organisation, 
and the targeted elimination of political Muslim movements. Religion was 
confined to the private realm.133 The political and legal aspirations of the 
Islamic groups were accommodated in the state’s legal system and admin-
istration through the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the establishment of 
the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). In the last two tenures of President 
Suharto, several aspects of Islamic law were put into state law. In particular, 
Law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Courts recognised religious courts as being 
equal to other courts.134
During the Reformation Era, all religious groups have had the same 
space to grow and develop. Several Islamic organisations were established, 
including political parties, marking the re-emergence of religious identity 
politics in the political arena. However, Islamic parties did not gain a sig-
nificant number of votes, indicating a major shift in the socio-political 
configuration of Muslim communities in Indonesia for whom political 
choice was no longer related to personal religiosity.135 This also confirms 
that most Indonesian Muslim communities hold reformist views on the 
relationship between religion and the state.
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Following Indonesian independence, the legal pluralism that had been 
in place under the colonial government was a serious concern for the new 
independent state. Legal pluralism had meant citizens were treated differ-
ently and often discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity 
and regionalism. The struggle for freedom was thus not only a struggle 
for independence from the colonial regime but also a struggle for equal 
rights and the end of different legal treatment. For this reason, the young 
post-colonial Indonesia clearly rejected legal pluralism and held that legal 
unification should replace plural colonial law. This also implied the rejec-
tion of religious law,136 a course that became explicit in the transition from 
the Old Order to the New Order in the mid-1960s. The State’s Direction 
Principles (GBHN)137 make it clear that a national legal system originating 
from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution should be established. This policy 
was supposed to improve religious life and belief in God Almighty in har-
mony with and in accordance with Pancasila,
The state now had to juggle two competing objectives: that of real-
ising a simple and definite legal unification on the one hand and that of 
accommodating the plurality of laws that exist in society on the other. 
The existence of the marriage registration law138 during the Old Order, 
and more recently of the Marriage Law, the Compilation of Islamic Law 
(KHI),139 the Zakat Management Law,140 the Hajj Law,141 the Waqf Law,142 
the Sharia Banking Law143 and State Sharia Securities Law (SBSN)144 are 
widely seen as indications of Muslim groups’ success in incorporating 
Islamic law into state law. However, these laws were in fact needed for 
legal unification. The laws have three objectives: (1) unifying the laws 
that apply to Muslims; (2) maximising the economic potential of Mus-
lims; (3) protecting and facilitating religious life. Since these objectives 
136 However, current developments point in a different direction since many countries have 
adopted legal pluralism, particularly in the private domain (Mirjam Künkler and Yüksel 
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are defined by the state as a secular institution, they have to be under-
stood as secular themselves.
The goal of Islamic law unification, including the homogenisation of 
Islamic groups, is evident in the Marriage Law and the KHI. The Mar-
riage Law was established to apply to all citizens and ensure administrative 
and procedural unity, although substantively determined by the people’s 
respective religions and beliefs. The KHI arose from the need for a uni-
form Islamic law that could be applied in religious courts to decide cases of 
marriage, inheritance, and waqf.145 Before the KHI, the Supreme Court, as 
the oversight body for religious courts, was confronted with the difficulty 
of lacking an authoritative source of material Islamic law, resulting in dif-
ferences of verdict, and public unrest.146
The second goal, maximising the economic potential of Muslims, led to 
the formation of the Sharia Banking Law, the Waqf Law, the SBSN Law, and 
the Zakat Law. The Zakat Law was established so that zakat could be used 
to improve welfare, alleviate poverty and eliminate social disparities. Zakat 
was to be managed professionally including the provision of supervisory 
bodies.147 The Waqf Law does not merely make waqf part of worship, but 
stresses its economic potential to advance social welfare. Under the law, 
waqf should be managed for the benefit of society in accordance with the 
principles of Sharia. The main objective of the SBSN Law is to increase the 
state revenue in order to support national economic sustainability. The law 
was expected to mobilise public funds and help develop the Sharia eco-
nomic and financial sectors as part of the national economic system.148 The 
Sharia Banking Law responds to the manifold and increasing demands for 
Sharia banking services and products needed to raise public funds to boost 
the national economy.149
The Hajj Law serves to facilitate worship in Indonesia. It recognises 
citizens’ freedom to worship and obliges the state to ensure worship can 
take place in a safe and orderly manner.150 The law also states that the state 
should manage pilgrimages, because they influence the good name and 
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dignity of the Indonesian abroad.151 Another law that led to legal plural-
ism is the Aceh Special Autonomy Law,152 which allows the enforcement of 
Islamic law through local laws that differ from national laws. However, this 
law relates specifically to the conflict in Aceh over the granting of special 
regional autonomy. Moreover, on a practical level, the local laws in Aceh as 
well the local Sharia regulations in some other regions only relate to some 
minor criminal offences related to decency.153
The State and Aspirations for Islamic Law – Democratic and  
Authoritarian Regimes
Indonesia’s democratic and authoritarian systems have taken different 
approaches to accommodating religious law. While the democratic re-
gimes of the Reformation Era have created several laws that adopted or 
derived from Islamic law or were at least friendly towards Islamic law, 
under the authoritarian regimes of the Old Order (guided democracy) 
and the New Order, the state dominated religion by restricting and con-
trolling religious groups and rejecting their aspirations to implement 
Islamic law. 154
The Old Order regime was opposed to Islamic groups and did not issue 
any laws deriving from Islamic law. Laws concerning religion, such as the Blas-
phemy Law, did not directly relate to Islamic law, but had an immense effect on 
religious life. The Blasphemy Law even aims to control the development of re-
ligions other than those that have been officially recognised by the state. From 
an institutional perspective, the most important legal development during the 
Old Order was the invention of public mechanisms for marriage and divorce, 
the administration of which was handled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
Furthermore, the number of religious courts decreased because of Law No. 32 
of 1954, which prohibited the establishment of courts outside Java.155
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While religious life developed and was even supported by the state in 
the New Order period, it was strictly limited to the realm of worship to 
avoid disrupting the stability of the regime. The state also put substan-
tial pressure on unrecognised religions and beliefs and many beliefs were 
prohibited and disbanded. Islamic political activities were repressed, and 
religious organisations and adherents of beliefs were kept under surveil-
lance by the government bureaucracy, especially the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs.156 Nevertheless, the state also facilitated some religious activities, 
such as the construction of mosques. In terms of institutions, the New 
Order period saw significant developments with the re-establishment 
of religious courts as separate courts parallel to public courts with the 
authority to decide on marriage and inheritance issues.157 The state also 
encouraged the formation of a single organisation for each recognised re-
ligion. These organisations would ultimately become instruments of state 
control over religion. They were the MUI for Islam, the Communion of 
Indonesian Churches (PGI) for Protestants, the Indonesian Catholic Church 
Conference (KWI) for Catholics, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia 
(PHDI) for Hindus, the Indonesian Buddhist Representatives (WALUBI) 
for Buddhists, and the Supreme Council of Confucian Religions of Indonesia 
(MATAKIN) for Confucians.
In the democratic Reformation Era, the aspirations of Islamic groups 
can be seen in the formation of social and political Muslim organisations, 
and the implementation of certain Islamic laws in state law. Some of these 
laws, such as the Pornography Law158 and the Sharia local law have been 
controversial. Where Islamic law has been successfully implemented, this 
has generally been related to Sharia economic arrangements and certain 
religious regulations related to muamallah.159
That the democratic regimes in Indonesia have been and are more re-
sponsive to Islamic law than authoritarian regimes is in accordance with 
the theory of the relationship between politics and law, which states that 
more democratic regimes tend to produce more responsive laws and, 
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157 See Law No. 14 of 1970 and Law No. 7 of 1989.
158 Law No. 44 of 2008 on Pornography.
159 These laws are the Hajj Law, the Zakat Management Law, the Waqf Law, the SBSN Law, 
and the Sharia Banking Law.
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conversely, that authoritarian regimes create repressive laws.160 With regard 
to the determination of boundaries between the state and religion, authori- 
tarian regimes dictate the determination of these boundaries whereas in 
democratic regimes, the boundaries are negotiated more dynamically and 
are influenced by the given constellation of political forces. As a conse-
quence, the agenda of secularisation is more applicable to authoritarian 
regimes than democratic regimes, which can even become a space for reli-
gious revival, including in the state’s domain.
Positivisation Leads to Secularisation
There have been efforts to enforce Islamic law for Muslims in state law 
since before Indonesia’s independence, both in the form of efforts to estab-
lish Islam as the state’s founding principle, and in the form of demands to 
implement Sharia as national law for Muslims.
Sharia can be divided into five legal spheres. First, matters of person-
al status such as marriage, divorce, waqf, and inheritance. Second, the 
regulation of economic transactions and banking. Third, regulations on 
religious practices such as dress codes, gambling, and other provisions 
related to decency. Fourth, penal law including types of punishment. And 
fifth, the use of Islam as guidance for how the government operates. Ac-
cording to Azyumardi Azra and Arskal Salim, Indonesia’s application of 
Sharia in state law is limited to areas that are viewed as personal, optional 
rules.161
Islamic law is an integral part of Islamic teachings that come from God 
through the Qur’an and Sunnah. From this point of view, Islamic law is not 
a product of politics. When Islamic law is applied to a particular political 
issue, it thus requires political legitimacy that is established by the legis-
lation mechanism. However, efforts to apply Islamic law to controversial 
political matters result in problems for interreligious relations in Indone-
sia. In order to maintain the commitment to religious plurality, Islamic law 
is enforced only on questions and to a level that makes non-Muslims feel 
160 Mahfud MD, Politik Hukum di Indonesia, 76–77.
161 Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, “Introduction: The State and Shari’a in the Perspective 
of Indonesian Legal Politics,” in Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia, ed. Arskal Salim 
and Azyumardi Azra (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 11–12.
38
secure. As with Western laws or customary laws, it is only at this stage that 
Islamic law becomes part of national law.162
State laws derived from Islamic law are usually regarded as evidence of 
Muslim groups’ success in their fight to implement Sharia.163 However, in 
this context, the validity of Sharia is governed by state law. The state may 
restrict or even alter the substance of the law derived from Sharia with the 
result that there is often a difference between state law derived from Sha-
ria and ‘Sharia’ itself. Furthermore, the positivisation of Sharia law places 
its administration and enforcement more under the state’s authority than 
religious authority. At some point, one’s obedience to the law is then no 
longer based on religious teachings but based on the fact that it is state law, 
with the result that the relationship is no longer between servant and God, 
but between citizens and the state. As such, the implementation of Islamic 
law in state law, which was originally intended to ensure the enforcement 
of Islamic law, instead resulted in the secularisation of the law.164
In the case of the Marriage Law, secularisation occurred by restricting 
marriage and divorce, and organising them through public administrative 
processes. Although marriage must be conducted in line with religion, cer-
tain registration requirements must be met for the marriage to be considered 
legally valid. The Marriage Law also differs from Islamic law on the subject 
of women’s rights, monogamy, and divorce mechanisms.165 Differences be-
tween state law and Islamic law can also be found in the Zakat Management 
Law, the Waqf Law, the Sharia Banking Law, and the SBSN Law.
Islamic law, which is formalised in the Compilation of Islamic Law 
(KHI), also underlies processes of secularisation. As a product of the New 
Order political process, the KHI is a reflection of Indonesian society with 
its various motifs, cultures, and other interests. Nevertheless, it contains 
certain aspects of Islamic law that had to be unified and reduced with the 
result that it does not represent the opinions of all groups. As a product of 
162 Wahid, Fiqh Indonesia, 12.
163 Wahid, 13.
164 Similar processes of secularisation through positivisation of Islamic law have been 
shown also by Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Secularisation through Legal Modernisation in 
the MENA-Region,” in Companion to the Study of Secularity, ed. HCAS “Multiple Secula- 
rities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” (Leipzig University, 2019), www.multiple- 
secularities.de/publications/companion/css_arjomand_legal-modernisation.pdf for 
Syria and Tunisia.
165 Marc Cammack, Adriaan Bedner, and Stijn van Huis, “Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Islamic Family Law in Post Soeharto Indonesia,” New Middle Eastern Studies 5 (2015): 8.
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a political process, the KHI results from its status as a state law, not from 
its religious status. Islamic law was secularised through its positivisation 
within the KHI which was a political compromise reduced to the fields of 
marriage, waqf, and inheritance, while Islamic law actually should have a 
perfect character (kamil), be harmonic (wasathiyah), dynamic (murunah), 
and cover the entire sphere of human life (syumul).166
In terms of institutions, the division of the judicial authority and the 
terminology of religious law and (non-religious) state law imply the exis-
tence of distinct religious and non-religious areas. Mazurki Wahid inter-
prets this as a manifestation of a secularist outlook, because the religious 
law gets its justification from the state while the separation between reli-
gious and state territory is maintained.167
Indonesia’s Secularity: National Integration, Accommodating  
Diversity, and Individual Freedom
The basis of secularity in Indonesia is Pancasila. As the national ideology, 
Pancasila is not only the philosophical foundation of the state’s admin-
istration but also provides guidance on social life. The use of Pancasila 
to address the issue of national integration challenges the notion of indi-
vidual freedom and religious freedom in particular. The first principle of 
Pancasila, “Belief in the One Almighty God”, accommodates both nation-
alist and Islamist groups, but not traditional local religions and beliefs. In-
deed, the first principle has even become the basis for the denial and con-
trol of these creeds and beliefs, and serves as the basis for the Blasphemy 
Law, through which the six recognised religions protect themselves from 
heresy or deviance such as syncretist beliefs or local religious traditions. 
In a similar vein, Indonesian Marriage Law states that marriages must be 
held in accordance with the couple’s religion. This is interpreted as refer-
ring only to the major religious teachings, controlled by the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs.168 From a liberal perspective, the law is supposed to be an 
166 Wahid, Fiqh Indonesia, 140.
167 Wahid, 99. Similar processes of reform and positivisation of Sharia also took place in 
Egypt, which Talal Asad refers to as part of secularisation (Talal Asad, Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 218).
168 See the Indonesia Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 68/PUU-XII/2014.
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institution to guarantee freedom of religion and to protect minorities. Yet 
in Indonesia, as well as in some Western democracies, minority religions 
are at least partly incompatible with the dominant values and traditions, 
which puts them in a less protected position.169
The development of Indonesian secularity was determined by dynamic 
changes in the socio-political power structures. Islamic law has been and 
will likely continue to be incorporated into state law on a broader scale 
where three conditions are met: (1) the power of the Islamist and the 
nationalist groups is relatively balanced. This occurred both during the 
discussions in the BPUPKI and in the Reformation Era. (2) The Islamist 
group is in possession of state power. This has never happened in Indo-
nesia, not even during the government of Abdurrahman Wahid, the for-
mer chairman of the NU, since Wahid’s policies cannot be attributed to the 
Islamist camp. (3) The state needs support or legitimacy from Islamist 
groups, as was the case in the second half of the New Order period. At 
this point, the state law was mainly to maintain unity, in particular to ac-
commodate the Islamist group. Secularity consequently aimed to balance 
socio-political power.170
There are limits on the areas in which Islamic law may become the sub-
stance of state law. First, it may only deal with the governance of religion in 
person-to-person relationships (muamallah, forum externum), and not the 
relationship between man and God, which consequently fully becomes in-
dividual (worship, forum internum). For example, the Hajj Law regulates the 
management and organisation of hajj pilgrimages, but it does not regulate 
the validity and rituals of hajj worship. Second, Islamic law is never incorpo-
rated into public law (criminal law and government), because public law has 
to apply equally to all citizens regardless of their religion.171 These two limits 
build a form of secularity for the sake of balancing and accommodating the 
religious diversity of Indonesian society. The guiding ideas are the principle 
of the state not intervening in the individual’s religious life and the enactment 
of public law to ensure tolerance and respect for the equal rights of citizens.
169 Ofrit Liviatan, “Faith in the Law – The Role of Legal Arrangements in Religion-Based 
Conflicts Involving Minorities,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Re-
view 34, no. 1 (2011): 54.
170 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities,” 890.
171 There are some exceptions to this in the province of Aceh. However, these exceptions 
are limited to this one province. In terms of content, the regulations in Aceh relate to the 
subject of decency.
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The boundaries between the domain of the state and the religious do-
main can be identified by analysing the secularity enshrined in Pancasila 
and the development of state law regarding religious life. 
• First, there is a clear distinction between state institutions, state law and 
religions. The state remains within the secular or worldly realm with 
all its rules and devices, which are also established and carried out in 
a secular manner. Nevertheless, state laws and policies continue to be 
influenced by reasons derived from religious teachings. Governance 
is in the state’s domain but religion can play a role by strengthening social 
ethics and influencing state policy and law through political mechanisms.
• Second, the state does not create laws that either require the implemen-
tation of certain religious teachings or interfere with religious freedom 
and worship. The state guarantees and facilitates religious freedom and 
freedom of worship with the only restriction being that religious actors 
should not endanger public order and security.
• Third, Islamic law can influence and be incorporated into state law. 
When it becomes state law, it becomes part of the secular and may be 
limited by the state. This can be seen for example in the limitation of 
the religious courts, the limitation of polygamy, and the regulation of 
zakat. The state’s authority to limit Islamic law that has become state 
law has been reinforced in the Constitutional Court’s decisions172 on 
the judicial review of Marriage Law,173 on the Religious Court Law,174 
and on the Zakat Management Law.175
• Fourth, the state laws’ regulation of religious life relates only to the 
forum externum,176 that is the social aspects of worship, human relation-
ships, and especially aspects related to family law. When it comes to wor-
ship, the state only regulates the facilities, not the rituals themselves.
• Fifth, public law (constitutional, administrative, and criminal law) is 
the domain of state law only, Islamic law never becomes public law.
172 Alfitri, “Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Sebagai Tafsiran Resmi Hukum Islam di Indone-
sia,” Jurnal Konstitusi 11, no. 2 (2014): 313.
173 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 12/PUU-V/2007.
174 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 19/PUU-VI/2008.
175 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 86/PUU-X/2012.
176 The Constitutional Court’s Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009.
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Conclusion
The socio-religious conditions of Indonesian society are closely connected 
to the social groups that determined the relationship between religion and 
state. In the pre-independence period, in terms of political orientation the 
santri mainly identified with the Islamist group that wanted Islam as the 
state’s foundation, while the abangan and priyayi became part of the na-
tionalist camp, which promoted a secular nation-state. A compromise be-
tween these two groups was reached with the formulation of Pancasila in 
the Jakarta Charter, which pointed to an Islamic state, which would have 
been obliged to implement Sharia for Muslims.
However, the formulation of Pancasila was changed during the adop-
tion of the 1945 Constitution due to objections from non-Muslim groups. 
For this reason, the first principle of Pancasila became “Belief in the One 
Almighty God”, which was intended as a general recognition of the reli-
gious character of the Indonesian people. In the mid-1950s, this principle 
again was subject to debate between Islamist and nationalist groups, but in 
the end remained in its 1945 version since no new agreement was reached.
The political power of the Islamist camp declined dramatically when 
Masyumi was dissolved in 1960. The Islamists’ hopes of rising up and be-
coming a political force again during the New Order, were disappointed 
due to the New Order’s restrictive policy on all religions, and political 
Islam in particular. The New Order aimed to de-Islamise existing poli- 
tical parties. Pancasila was emphasised as the sole national ideology and 
politically influential Islamist groups ceased to exist during this period. 
The new Islamic movements that emerged under the New Order were 
of a civil-democratic nature and did not relate to any particular political 
party, especially not the old Islamist camp. These new movements, which 
aimed to establish a civil society oriented towards justice, freedom, and 
social autonomy, played a major role in the democratic transition of the 
Reformation Era.
Pancasila is a dynamic institutionalisation of Indonesian secularity. It is 
a joint agreement resulting from the need to address the issue of religious 
and ethnic diversity. It establishes a form of secularity for the sake of na-
tional unity in order to achieve progress, and particularly independence 
and social welfare.
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Laws related to religion and especially to Islam mainly pursued three 
goals: (1) unifying the laws that apply to Muslims; (2) maximising the eco-
nomic potential of Muslims; (3) protecting and facilitating religious life. 
These three objectives are secular and pursued by the state as a secular 
institution.
The three main periods of Indonesia’s history show that democratic po-
litical regimes have been more responsive to Islamic law than authoritarian 
regimes. The authoritarian regimes strongly dominated boundary-making 
between state and religion, while under the democratic regimes, the bound-
aries have been the subject of negotiations and been dynamically influenced 
by the respective constellation of socio-political forces. The idea of secu-
larism and a well-aimed secularisation process consequently applies better 
to the authoritarian regimes, while the democratic regimes have even been 
spaces of religious revival and increasing religious impact on the state.
Although the existence of state laws derived from Islamic law in Indo-
nesia is usually seen as a reflection of Islamist groups’ successful efforts to 
fight for the application of Islamic law, the incorporation of Islamic law 
actually enables the state to limit or even alter its legal substance and its 
legal enforcement. Furthermore, a person’s obedience to Islamic law in this 
way is no longer based on religious teaching but on the fact that it has be-
come state law. Therefore, the regulation of Islamic law in state law actually 
leads to the secularisation of Islamic law.
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